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Introduction 
Recently, the issues of immigration and immigration policy have garnered 
intense debate in the United States.1  Much of what Americans have discussed 
relates to border security, sanctions against employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented workers,2 and temporary and permanent paths to legalization for 
undocumented workers.3  This debate often overshadows a meaningful 
discussion about the future of workplace rights for undocumented workers who, 
despite their undocumented status, currently work in the United States and at 
times suffer labor and employment law violations in their workplaces.  
Unfortunately, the national immigration debate has not incorporated this 
discussion.4  Moreover, the current proposed federal immigration bills neither 
 
† Assistant Professor of Employment and Labor Law, Industrial and Labor Relations 
School, Cornell University and 2005 Skadden Fellow.  I would like to thank Leslie Gates 
for her comments on earlier drafts.  I would also like to acknowledge Aaron Skrypski, 
Elizabeth Rabe, and the editorial staff of the Cornell International Law Journal for their 
thoughtful feedback and able editorial support. 
 1. See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Kennedy Plea Was Last Gasp for Immigration Bill, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2007, at A1. 
 2. When I refer to “undocumented workers,” I am referring to workers that do not 
currently have legal authorization from the U.S. government to be physically present in 
the United States. 
 3. See Raymond Hernandez, Opinions, Far Apart, Underscore Immigration Bill's 
Obstacles, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at B1. 
 4. For a recent and rare news editorial addressing the issue of labor standards 
within the immigration debate, see Lawrence Downes, Editorial, Worker Solidarity 
Doesn't Have to Stop at the Rio Grande, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4, at 11. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2079676
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address nor clarify what effect they will have on the workplace rights of 
undocumented workers. 
Similar to Professor Cunningham-Parmeter’s article,5 this article focuses 
on one aspect of the new legal landscape for undocumented workers in the 
United States since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.6  One central element of this new legal landscape is 
ongoing confusion about what effect, if any, immigration policy has on federal 
and state labor and employment law7 in the United States.  Below, I take a first 
step toward clarifying the extent to which immigration policy affects the rights 
of states to extend the full protection of their state labor and employment laws8 
to undocumented workers.  Specifically, I address the following unresolved 
question currently before many lower courts: When, if ever, does federal 
immigration law preempt certain state labor and employment law remedies?  
First, I briefly describe why this question has emerged and has become 
important in U.S. courts.  Next, I describe recent U.S. Supreme Court 
Supremacy Clause jurisprudence indicating that some lower courts’ answers to 
the preemption question described above threaten to stretch the Supremacy 
Clause beyond its constitutionally-intended boundaries.   
I. Emergence of the Question 
A. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
Before 1986, U.S. immigration policy did not contain workplace-specific 
restrictions.9  For instance, immigration law did not directly restrict employers 
from hiring undocumented workers, and there were no immigration laws that 
specifically restricted undocumented workers from working or accepting 
work.10  That is not to say, however, that immigration authorities stayed out of 
the workplace before 1986.11  The key distinction is that an undocumented 
worker’s act of working and an employer’s act of knowingly hiring an 
undocumented worker were not illegal acts under U.S. immigration law before 
1986.12  In 1986, much of this changed when Congress enacted the Immigration 
 
 5. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the 
Fifth Amendment, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27. 
 6. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 7. When I refer to labor and employment law, I am speaking of laws enacted by the 
U.S. government, the District of Columbia, or the fifty U.S. states. 
 8. I refer broadly to labor and employment law statutes and common law that 
provide some form of workplace right and remedy. 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 99–682(I), at 51–56 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5649, 5655–60. 
 10. See generally id. 
 11. See, e.g., Gerald M. Boyd, Jackson Describes the Reagan Administration As 
‘Warmongering,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1984, at B8 (referring to U.S. immigration 
officials’ raids of workplaces); Linda Greenhouse, High Court Backs Factory Searches 
for Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1984, at A1 (referring to immigration raids of 
two Los Angeles factories). 
 12. See generally H. R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at 51-56. 
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Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).13  Along with amnesty for over one 
million undocumented immigrants,14 the IRCA brought workplace-specific 
restrictions into U.S. immigration policy.15  The way in which the IRCA moved 
immigration enforcement more intimately into the workplace created mixed 
messages and, therefore, confusion about whether the IRCA intended to combat 
illegal immigration by restricting undocumented workers’ access to specific 
labor and employment law remedies in the event that employers violated their 
workplace rights. 
The IRCA contained a number of mixed messages regarding the role of 
workplace restrictions in immigration enforcement.  First, by both mandating an 
employee verification system and establishing civil and criminal sanctions for 
employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers,16 the IRCA made it 
unlawful for employers to knowingly hire undocumented workers.17  Next, in 
1990, the IRCA made it unlawful for undocumented workers to knowingly use 
fraudulent documents to obtain employment.18  Notably, however, the IRCA 
specifically did not make it unlawful for an undocumented worker who did not 
use fraudulent documents to work or accept employment.  Also, the IRCA did 
not indicate explicitly whether it would have any effect on the legal remedies 
available to undocumented workers who suffered violations of state and federal 
labor and employment laws in the workplace.  The IRCA’s express preemption 
provision dealt only with its preemptive effect on state laws sanctioning 
employers for hiring undocumented immigrant workers.19 
B. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB 
Given the IRCA’s increased restrictions on the actions of undocumented 
workers in 1990, courts increasingly have faced the question of whether 
Congress intended to place additional workplace restrictions on undocumented 
workers by reducing their access to certain labor and employment law remedies 
that were available to them as a result of their employers’ workplace rights 
 
 13.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael H. LeRoy & Wallace Hendricks, Should ‘Agricultural 
Laborers’ Continue to Be Excluded from the National Labor Relations Act?, 48 EMORY 
L.J. 489, 498 n.42 (1999) (“The IRCA permitted the granting of temporary resident 
status to as many as 350,000 aliens who could prove they performed agricultural services 
for at least 90 days between May 1, 1985 and May 1, 1986.”); Editorial, Give Illegal 
Aliens More Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, at A24 (“The 1986 Immigration Reform 
and Control Act provided amnesty for the estimated 1.4 million to 2 million 
undocumented aliens who have been in the United States since before 1982.”). 
 15. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 274A(a)–(d). 
 16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b), (e)(4)–(5), (f) (2000). 
 17. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A). 
 18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (2000). 
 19. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (“The provisions of this section preempt any state or 
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar 
laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized 
aliens.”); Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The 
statute is silent . . . as to its preemptive effect on any other state or local laws.”). 
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violations.20  The Supreme Court addressed whether the IRCA affected the 
remedies available to undocumented workers pursuant to the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA)21 in Hoffman, a decision that generated additional 
confusion about the effect of the IRCA on labor and employment law 
enforcement in cases involving undocumented workers. 
The Hoffman Court held that the National Labor Relations Board could not 
grant back pay (lost future earnings) to a worker who had violated the IRCA by 
submitting fraudulent documents as a remedy for his employer’s NLRA 
violation.22  This decision created confusion in lower courts about whether the 
IRCA similarly affected lost future earnings and other remedies available to 
undocumented workers pursuant to both state laws and federal laws beyond the 
NLRA.23  Much scholarship has been dedicated to addressing these perplexing 
questions.24  Lower courts grappling with the relationship between immigration 
enforcement through the IRCA and labor and employment enforcement at the 
federal and state level have arrived at varied results.25 
Here I touch on a subset of the post-IRCA and post-Hoffman questions: 
Does the IRCA preempt any state labor and employment remedies of lost future 
earnings26 for undocumented workers and if so, when?  It is well-established 
that the preemption analysis is fundamentally a question of congressional 
intent.27  Therefore, the underlying question is whether Congress intended the 
IRCA’s workplace restrictions to limit undocumented workers’ access to labor 
 
 20. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142 n.2 (2002). 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006) (regulating collective bargaining and organizing 
rights of covered private sector employees). 
 22. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140–41.  It is important to note that 
Hoffman is not a case about whether undocumented workers are covered by the National 
Labor Relations Act.  There is little doubt that undocumented workers are “employees” 
according to the NLRA and therefore have all of the same rights as documented workers.  
Instead, Hoffman concerns itself with the remedies available to undocumented workers 
once a court has determined that the undocumented workers have suffered an NLRA 
violation of their rights.  See id. at 142-49. 
 23. See, e.g., María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the 
United States Legal System After Hoffman Plastic Compounds: An Assessment and 
Comparison with Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 301, 307–14 
(2005). 
 24. See id.; Michael Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undocumented Workers, 6 U. PA. 
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 513–17 (2004). 
 25. See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 219, 239 n.21 (2d Cir. 
2006); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 26. I focus on the remedy of lost future earnings, rather than the remedy of 
reinstatement, because the lost future earnings remedy is most relevant to the Supreme 
Court’s Hoffman decision and more often addressed by lower courts facing a preemption 
analysis.  The reinstatement remedy is much more likely to be preempted by the IRCA, 
because a court-ordered reinstatement of an undocumented worker would require an 
employer to violate the IRCA by knowingly hiring someone without proper 
identification.  See Wishnie, supra note 24, at 505 (finding lost future earnings remedy to 
be less “troublesome” in the preemption context and stating that “courts have approved 
only those reinstatement orders that are conditioned on an undocumented worker 
securing INS work authorization within a reasonable period of time.”). 
 27. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990). 
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and employment law remedies of lost future earnings at the state level. 
In answering this IRCA preemption question, some lower courts following 
the Hoffman decision have broadened the reach of the Supremacy Clause.  For 
instance, a Florida district court in Veliz v. Rental Service Corp. USA, Inc. relied 
on Hoffman to hold that the IRCA preempted a state tort law remedy of lost 
future earnings to an undocumented worker who had violated the IRCA. 28  In 
arriving at this conclusion, the Veliz court went so far as to say that “[i]n 
addition to trenching upon the immigration policy of the United States in 
condoning prior violations of immigration laws awarding lost wages would be 
tantamount to violating the IRCA.”29  The court appears to have reasoned that 
awarding these types of damages to undocumented workers would be a 
violation of the IRCA.30  The court, however, did not cite to a particular 
provision of the IRCA in making its determination.31 
The confusion about the IRCA’s effect on undocumented workers’ access 
to state labor and employment law remedies is also demonstrated by courts that 
have a difficult time determining whether a state law remedy of lost future 
earnings is preempted (and therefore cannot be provided to an undocumented 
worker) in the absence of an IRCA violation.  For instance, in Affordable 
Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Silva, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, noting the difficulty of the determination, found that the IRCA did not 
preempt New York State’s scaffolding law remedy where the undocumented 
worker did not violate the IRCA.32 
 
II. Supreme Stretch 
As I will describe below, a brief review of general Supremacy Clause 
principles and recent Supremacy Clause cases indicates that courts may be 
going beyond currently-established Supremacy Clause borders when they 
determine that federal immigration policy preempts undocumented workers’ 
access to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings. 
 
 
 28. 313 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1336–37 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 29. Id. at 1336. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See generally id. 
 32. 469 F.3d 219, 249 (2d Cir. 2006).  In a recent New York district court case, 
however, the court declined to dismiss plaintiff’s lost future earnings claim even though 
it appeared that the plaintiff violated the IRCA.  See Reis v. Vannatta Realty, 515 F. 
Supp. 2d 441, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  For another very recent example, see Contreras v. 
KV Trucking, Inc., No. 4:04-CV-398, 2007 WL 2777518, at 5–6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 
2007) (“Even if the Defendants did not waive the defense, their motion would still be 
denied.  ‘Texas law does not require citizenship or the possession of immigration work 
authorization permits as a prerequisite to recovering damages for lost earning 
capacity.’”) (citation omitted). 
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A. Principles Weighing Against Preemption 
It would be a “supreme stretch” for courts to find that the IRCA preempts 
state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings for 
undocumented workers because Supremacy Clause principles, established by 
Supreme Court case law, weigh against finding preemption in these cases.  
First, courts may be less inclined to find preemption because, given the delicate 
balance between state and federal sovereignty, there is a well-established 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant a state’s police power to 
regulate the workplace33 unless it does so explicitly.34  With the IRCA, 
Congress did not expressly state that it intended to preempt state labor and 
employment law remedies.35 
Second, courts may be less apt to find preemption in these cases because 
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to preempt state labor 
and employment law enforcement in any way.  The U.S. House of 
Representatives committee report issued in conjunction with the IRCA indicates 
that the legislation was not meant “to undermine or diminish in any way labor 
protections in existing law . . . or . . . limit the powers of federal or state labor 
relations boards . . . to remedy unfair practices committed against 
undocumented employees.”36  Even though legislative history is not explicit 
evidence of congressional intent, it suggests that courts may be less inclined to 
find that the IRCA preempts state law remedies of lost future earnings in these 
cases. 
Third, courts may be less willing to find preemption in these cases because 
it is possible to enforce simultaneously both the state labor and employment law 
remedy of lost future earnings and the IRCA.  Courts in general are less inclined 
to find preemption when state and federal law can be interpreted in such a way 
to allow for simultaneous enforcement.  If an employee violates immigration 
law, the immigration authorities have the power to bring charges against that 
 
 33. It is well established that when states regulate workplaces, they act according to 
their traditional police powers.  See, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) 
(“States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment 
relationship to protect workers within the State.  Child labor laws, minimum and other 
wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen's compensation 
laws are only a few examples.”).   
 34. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“In all pre-emption cases . . . 
we ‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.’”) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 35. See Affordable Hous. Found., 469 F.3d at 231–32 (“From its initial enactment, 
IRCA has contained an express preemption clause, stating that ‘[t]he provisions of this 
section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than 
through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee 
for employment, unauthorized aliens.’  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).  The statute is silent, 
however, as to its preemptive effect on any other state or local laws.”). 
 36. See H.R. REP. NO. 99–682(I), at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5649, 5662. 
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employee even if that employee has received certain remedies according to state 
labor and employment law.37  In other words, an undocumented worker’s 
receipt of lost future earnings should not prohibit or deter immigration 
authorities from enforcing the IRCA.  Despite the IRCA, the immigration and 
labor enforcement regimes are still separate with respect to which laws govern 
and who has standing to bring charges against whom.38  As long as these 
separate enforcement regimes are not in conflict, the courts will be less likely to 
find that the IRCA preempts state law remedies of lost future earnings. 
B. Case Law Weighing Against Preemption 
The IRCA preemption cases are cases of implied conflict preemption.39  
Courts find implied conflict preemption “where state law ‘stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”40  Therefore, the relevant question in an IRCA implied conflict 
preemption case is whether the state labor and employment law remedy of lost 
future earnings stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the IRCA’s 
purpose to decrease employment opportunities for undocumented workers.41  To 
begin to answer this question, I review recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
where the Court applied implied conflict preemption analysis, identify the 
boundaries that these cases have set on the Supremacy Clause, and then map 
 
 37. It is important to note here, as mentioned above, that the state labor and 
employment law remedy of reinstatement is preempted to the extent that it would force 
employers to knowingly hire or rehire undocumented workers in violation of the IRCA.  
Here I am referring only to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future 
earnings. 
 38. For instance, the government brings IRCA cases against allegedly 
undocumented persons in immigration court but employees bring state labor and 
employment law cases against their employers in state court. 
 39. The Supreme Court has identified three main types of preemption: (1) express 
preemption, (2) field preemption, and (3) implied conflict preemption.  See Gade v. Nat’l 
Solid Wastes Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).  As noted above, the situation described 
here is not a case of express preemption because the IRCA does not contain any express 
language preempting state labor and employment law.  See supra note 35 and 
accompanying text.  Moreover, this is not a case of field preemption because it cannot be 
said that the federal regulatory scheme is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” with state labor and 
employment laws that provide lost future earnings remedies regardless of immigration 
status.  See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
 40. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 899 (2000) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 41. For statutory language suggesting that this is the IRCA’s purpose, see 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a (2000) and 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a)(1)–(3) (2000).  For further support from language 
in the IRCA’s legislative history, see Affordable Hous. Found., Inc. v. Silva, 469 F.3d 
219, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting, in part, legislative history, the court stated that 
“confronting a ‘large-scale influx of undocumented aliens,’ Congress concluded that ‘the 
most humane, credible and effective way to respond’ to the problem was to penalize 
those employers who hired illegal aliens . . . . ‘Employment is the magnet that attracts 
aliens here illegally . . . .  Employers will be deterred by the penalties in this legislation 
from hiring unauthorized aliens and this, in turn, will deter aliens from entering illegally 
or violating their status in search of employment.’”) (citations omitted). 
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these boundaries onto the IRCA preemption context.  My review of the IRCA 
cases reveals three types of implied preemption cases, which indicate that a 
finding of preemption in IRCA cases would stretch the Supremacy Clause 
beyond the current boundaries set forth by the Supreme Court. 
1. Supreme Stretch Number 1 
A finding that the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law 
remedies of lost future earnings would stretch the current boundaries of the 
Supremacy Clause because these remedies do not directly and substantially 
affect employment opportunities for undocumented workers.  In the absence of 
federal government findings indicating a link, it is too indirect and speculative 
to state that granting an undocumented worker lost future earnings under state 
labor and employment law increases employment opportunities for 
undocumented workers.  Although it is possible that a foreign worker might be 
inspired to immigrate to the United States based on the possibility of receiving 
lost future earnings if they successfully sue their employer, nothing indicates 
that the likelihood is substantial enough to imply a congressional intent to 
preempt state labor and employment law.  There is no indication that Congress 
intended to reduce incentives for foreign workers to come to the United States 
by reducing workers’ access to labor and employment law remedies.42  Instead, 
the IRCA’s focus is on reducing employment opportunities by making it more 
difficult for employers to hire undocumented workers.  For those undocumented 
workers who are already in the United States, there are no apparent findings that 
access to state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings 
would create substantial incentives for them to stay in the United States or 
facilitate their access to future employment in the United States. 
The case most often cited for the “direct” and “substantial” requirement is 
English v. General Electric Co.43 in which the Supreme Court rejected a similar 
incentive-based argument: that the availability of a state tort remedy, which was 
similar to the federal remedy, would reduce incentives for people to use the 
federal procedure because federal law had stricter time limits than state law.44  
In English, a federal nuclear safety whistle blower law set up remedies for 
employees who experience retaliation as a result of whistle blowing about 
safety violations.45  An employee sued under state tort theory for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and for retaliation resulting from her whistle 
blowing.46  The company argued that allowing her to pursue a state tort remedy, 
which was available after the time deadline for a similar federal law remedy 
 
 42. See 8 U.S.C. 1324a; 8 U.S.C. 1324c(a)(1)–(3); H.R. REP. NO. 99–682(I), at 46 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650 (“This legislation seeks to close the 
back door on illegal immigration so that the front door on legal immigration may remain 
open.  The principal meaning of closing the back door, or curtailing future illegal 
immigration, is through employer sanctions.”). 
 43.  496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990). 
 44. Id. at 89–90. 
 45. Id. at 75–76. 
 46. Id. at 77. 
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under the federal nuclear safety whistle blower law, would reduce the incentives 
for the whistle blower to bring federal charges and therefore would decrease 
timely reports of nuclear safety.47  The English Court found these comments 
about what motivates people to make a complaint to be too speculative, too 
much of a stretch, in this context.48  The Court stated that “[s]uch a prospect is 
simply too speculative a basis on which to rest a finding of pre-emption.”49 
Similarly, when considering the IRCA preemption cases, in the absence of 
any discernable congressional intent or findings, it is too speculative to base a 
finding of preemption on the assumption that future undocumented workers will 
be motivated to immigrate to the United States because of the potential 
availability of state labor and employment law remedies if they successfully sue 
their employers for workplace rights violations.  For undocumented workers 
who already live in the United States, it is likewise too speculative to say that 
their access to labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings will 
affect their access to employment opportunities in some way.50  In light of 
English, these scenarios are simply too speculative, too much of a stretch, to 
support a finding of an IRCA preemption.  The connection is simply not direct 
or substantial enough to find an IRCA preemption. 
2. Supreme Stretch Number 2 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hillsborough County v. Automated 
Medical Laboratories, Inc.51 exemplifies a second type of case indicating that a 
finding of an IRCA preemption would stretch the Supremacy Clause beyond its 
constitutional boundaries. Hillsborough held that federal law does not preempt 
state law when the effects are too speculative, the state law has an effect on an 
area where there are competing federal goals, and the federal government has 
not provided guidance about how to “strike a balance” between those competing 
goals.52  Therefore, the Hillsborough case indicates that the IRCA does not 
preempt state labor and employment law remedies of lost future earnings 
because of the amount of speculation involved and because Congress has not 
indicated how to address the possible conflict between its goal in enacting the 
IRCA, to reduce employment opportunities to undocumented workers, and its 
goal to allow states to promote minimum labor and employment standards 
through labor and employment law enforcement.53 
 
 47. See id. at 89. 
 48. See id. at 90. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704–705 (11th Cir. 1988) (“We 
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The Hillsborough Court faced the question of whether federal law—which 
had an identifiable goal to increase safety and to increase the amount of blood 
plasma available nationally—preempted a local law imposing blood plasma 
collection requirements that went beyond the safety requirements established by 
the federal law.54  In an attempt to convince the Court to find preemption of the 
local law, the plaintiff, Automated Medical Laboratories, argued that the 
requirements of the local law would reduce the number of blood plasma donors 
nationally, because the local law’s requirements would make it harder for 
people to donate blood.55  Therefore, Automated Medical Laboratories reasoned 
that the reduction in the number of plasma donors would conflict with the 
Congressional goal to ensure an adequate supply of plasma nationally.56 
The Hillsborough Court considered this argument but was not persuaded 
that the local law would result in a reduction of the blood plasma supply.  Thus, 
the Court held that the local law was not preempted.57  Specifically, the Court 
held that Automated Medical Laboratories’ concern that more stringent local 
regulation would lead to a decrease in donors was too speculative and therefore 
did not call for preemption.58  The court reasoned, for instance, that more 
stringent safety regulation might lead to an increase in donors because potential 
donors would have less fear about donating.59  Similar to English, Hillsborough 
demonstrates that it is too speculative to base a finding of preemption on the 
assumption that future undocumented workers will be motivated to immigrate 
to the United States because of the potential availability of state labor and 
employment law. 
Moreover, the Hillsborough Court determined that even if the local law did 
reduce the blood plasma supply nationally there was no preemption because 
neither Congress nor the FDA had affirmatively, “struck a particular balance 
between safety and quantity” of blood plasma.60  Similarly, under the IRCA, 
Congress has not struck a balance between the potentially competing goals of 
labor and employment law enforcement and immigration law enforcement.  In 
the absence of clear Congressional intent in the IRCA context, Hillsborough 
indicates that courts should not make their own policy judgments in the IRCA 
preemption cases. 
3. Supreme Stretch Number 3 
The third type of Supremacy Clause case demonstrates that a finding that 
the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law remedies of lost future 
earnings would stretch the Supremacy Clause beyond its constitutional 
boundaries.  Courts hesitate to find preemption in the absence of an affirmative 
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federal policy statement that federal law dominates a particular area.  In two 
recent Supreme Court Supremacy Clause cases, for instance, the difference 
between finding preemption in one case and finding no preemption in the other 
was that the circumstances of the latter case lacked any indication of an 
affirmative federal policy judgment indicating preemption.61 
In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court found that the 
federal law’s detailed and gradual phase-in of varied passive restraint 
requirements for car manufacturers, including air bags, seat belts, and other 
passive restraints, embodied an affirmative congressional policy judgment that, 
at that time, the existence of air bags in every car was not desirable. 62  The 
detailed and gradual phase-in contained in the federal regulations demonstrated 
enough of an affirmative federal policy judgment to convince the Court to find 
preemption.63  Because allowing their state tort law claim would present an 
actual conflict with this affirmative federal policy judgment, the Court found 
that the federal regulations preempted the common law tort action alleging that 
Honda was negligent in failing to install air bags in all of its cars.64 
In contrast, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Supreme Court found that 
federal law did not foreclose a state tort action based on a claim that boat motor 
manufacturers had a common law duty to install a propeller guard on all boat 
motors.65  The Sprietsma Court pointed out that the federal government had 
previously considered whether to require propeller guards on boat motors 
through federal legislation and had decided not to regulate in this area.66  
According to the Court, the federal government’s silence, even after having 
considered the propeller guard issue, did not express an affirmative policy 
statement one way or another about propeller guards.67  As a result, the state tort 
law claim was not preempted and was allowed to move forward.68  Viewed 
together, these two cases indicate that courts engaging in an IRCA preemption 
analysis should not speculate or create policy in the absence of any indication 
that Congress intended to make an affirmative policy statement to forego labor 
and employment law remedies of lost future earnings for undocumented 
workers in order to achieve some of its immigration law goals. 
Conclusion 
Recent Supreme Court Supremacy Clause cases indicate that some lower 
courts may be stretching the Supremacy Clause beyond its constitutionally-
intended boundaries because of the guesswork necessary to decide the IRCA 
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preemption cases in the absence of any discernible congressional intent.  In 
finding that the IRCA preempts state labor and employment law remedies of 
lost future earnings, these lower courts also threaten to undermine the 
foundation of the labor and employment law enforcement regime.  Judge 
Walker’s statement in his concurring opinion in the Second Circuit’s Silva 
decision, “Courts should not have to guess how often and to what extent 
employers and their illegal alien employees will break the law in order to decide 
a case,” expresses the difficulty and perhaps impropriety of asking and 
answering the types of IRCA Supremacy Clause questions discussed above.69 
This poignant statement, together with this brief review of Supremacy Clause 
jurisprudence, demonstrates the merit of and need for a more extensive review 
of the Supreme Court’s Supremacy Clause jurisprudence to understand fully the 
relationship between federal immigration policy and state labor and 
employment law in the IRCA preemption context. 
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